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CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING
The Utah Medical Association ("UMA") currendy represents approximately 3,000
physician members throughout the State of Utah. Many of these physicians routinely enter
into arbitration agreements with their patients. UMA physicians are currendy parties in
wrongful death lawsuits brought by the spouses and heirs of deceased patients. It is
unfortunate, but inevitable, that such cases will continue to be filed against UMA physicians
in the future, and that arbitration agreements will be at issue. Many UMA physicians will
thus be directly impacted by this Court's ruling in this appeal regarding the enforceability of
a physician-patient arbitration agreement against a deceased patient's heirs for claims of
wrongful death.
Accordingly, as UMA has a significant interest in the outcome of the Court's ruling
in this appeal, all parties, Appellant Alan Abdulla, M.D., and Appellee Lisa Bybee, have
consented to the appearance of the UMA as amicus curiae as required by Rule 25 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A Stipulation Consenting to the Filing of Amicus Brief
by the Utah Medical Association was filed with this Court on August 3, 2006. A copy of
this Stipulation is attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The UMA hereby adopts and incorporates the Statement of Jurisdiction, Statement
of Issues and Standard of Review set forth in the brief of Appellant.
IMPORTANT STATUTES
The determination regarding the enforcability of an arbitration agreement in a
medical malpractice action is governed in part by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2003 and 2004), and the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code
1

Ann. §§ 78-3 la-1 through 20 (2002). Copies of these statutes are attached at
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Medical Association adopts and incorporates the Statement of the Case set
forth in the brief of Appellant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Well-settled public policy favoring arbitration compels enforcement of arbitration
agreements against non-signatory spouses and heirs. Both the Utah Legislature and
Judiciary have repeatedly acknowledged and enforced a policy favoring arbitration in a
variety of contexts, including the physician-patient relationship. In 20045 the Utah
Legislature amended the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to specifically provide that
arbitration agreements apply to claims brought by a person who is not a party to the
contract. The express language of the statute reveals the Legislature's intent that arbitration
agreements be enforced against non-signatory spouses and heirs such as Mrs. Bybee.
In addition, fundamental principles of Utah contract law coupled with policy
favoring broad construction of arbitration agreements compels the enforcement of the
Arbitration Agreement in the instant case. The plain and unambiguous language of the
Agreement demonstrates the parties express intent to bind non-signatory spouses and heirs.
In accordance with axiomatic contract law, the Court should interpret and enforce the
Arbitration Agreement consistent with this intent. Further, this Court has made clear that
arbitration agreements should be construed in favor of arbitration. Thus, the Arbitration
Agreement should be enforced against Mrs. Bybee to give effect to the parties express intent
and uphold the policy of liberally construing arbitration agreements in favor of arbitration.

2

Failure to enforce the Arbitration Agreement would adversely impact Utah
physicians and their patients. It is simply unrealistic to require the signatures of all the
spouses and heirs in order to bind them to an arbitration agreement, particularly since they
may not even be identified until the time of death. This would also lead to an undesirable
invasion of the physician-patient relationship by requiring the patient to disclose
confidential medical treatment, and even worse, requiring the patienfs spouse and heirs to
concur in the treatment.
Finally, if arbitration agreements were held unenforceable against heirs for claims of
wrongful death, then they cannot be enforced against heirs for loss of consortium. This
would create the potential for anomalous results, as heirs could litigate their claims for loss
of consortium, while the patient must arbitrate her medical negligence claim on the same
operative facts.
Enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement against non-signatories such as Mrs.
Bybee is consistent with the language of the Utah Arbitration statutes, recent amendments
to the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, and the express language of the Agreement. In
addition, it is essential to further the goals of the legislative and judicially declared policy
favoring arbitration, to safeguard the physician-patient relationship, to preserve important
privacy rights of the patient, and to give effect to the intent of the parties to the Agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

WELL-ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
COMPELS ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
AGAINST SPOUSES AND HEIRS.
American courts, historically, refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate on the

ground that such agreements ousted the courts from their jurisdiction. Stephen P. Bedell,

3

Lolla Harrison and Brian Grant, Arbitrability: Current Developments in the Interpretation
and Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements, 13 J. Contemp. L. 1, 1-2 (1987). To
remedy this anachronism, Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act of 1924. Id.
The purpose of the Arbitration Act was to place arbitration agreements "upon the same
footing as other contracts, where they belong . . . .55 Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc. v. Byrd.
470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
With the passage of the Arbitration Act, Congress established "a strong federal policy
favoring arbitration.55 Harrison & Grant, supra, at 1-2; accord Shearson/American Exp.,
Inc. v. McMahon. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (federal policy favors arbitration). In effect, "the
Arbitration Act simply codifi[ed] the common law duty of courts to enforce the terms of
valid contracts, and was necessitated only by the traditional reluctance of courts to enforce
arbitration clauses.55 Harris & Grant, supra, at 1-2.
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that courts must compel arbitration
when a valid arbitration agreement exists. See e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp.. 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v. Keating. 465 U.S. 2
(1984); Perry v. Thomas. 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson.
513 U.S. 265 (1995); Doctors Assoc. Inc. v. Cassarotto. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). Virtually
every state has, moreover, articulated a strong policy in favor of arbitration.1
^ See e.g., Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Public Safety. 722 N.E.2d
441 (Mass. 2000) (strong public policy favoring arbitration); Vandenberg v. Superior
Court. 982 P.2d 229 (Cal. 1999) (same); Martin v. Vance. 514 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999) (same); Thunderstick Lodge. Inc. v. Reuer. 585 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1998)
(arbitration favored); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stinnett, 698 N.E.2d 339 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998) (strong public policy favoring arbitration); Perez v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.,
934 P.2d 732 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (same); Anthony v. Kaplan. 918 S.W.2d 174 (Ark.
1996) (same); Prudential Securities Inc. v. Marshall. 909 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1995)
(arbitration of disputes is strongly favored under federal and state law); White v. Kampner.
4

A.

Both the Utah Legislature and Judiciary Acknowledge and Enforce
Policy Favoring Arbitration.

Utah law comports with its federal and state counterparts in enforcing arbitration
agreements. In 1927 the Utah Legislature enacted the Uniform Arbitration Act, which
mandated enforcement of arbitration agreements. 1927 Utah Laws 62. Originally, the Act
applied only to the arbitration of existing controversies and did not cover agreements to
arbitrate future disputes. Allred v. Educators Mutual Ins. Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263,
1265 (Utah 1996). However, in 1977 the Utah Legislature amended the Act to include
the arbitration of future disputes. Utah Code. Ann. § 78-31-1 (1977). "Thus Utah law has
favored arbitration provisions covering future disputes since 1977." Allred. 909 P.2d at
1265.
The Utah Legislature further revised the Utah Arbitration Act, effective May 2003,
"to be more comprehensive and to (1) codify existing case law interpreting arbitration
statutes, (2) resolve ambiguities inherent within the statutes, and (3) modernize arbitration
practice and procedure.55 Kent B. Scott and James B. Belshe, Utah's Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act: A Makeover for the Face of Arbitration. 16 Dec. Utah B. J. 26, 27 (Dec.
2003). The Act makes clear arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable under Utah
law, and that parties can agree to arbitrate any controversy. It provides:

642 A.2d 1381 (Conn. 1994) (arbitration favored); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co.. 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989) (same); Roe v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. 533 So.2d 279 (Fla.
1988) (same); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Rose. 591 P.2d 281 (N.M. 1979) (strong preference
for resolution by arbitration); Modern Const.. Inc. v. Barce. Inc.. 556 P.2d 528 (Alaska
1976) (strong public policy favors arbitration); Grover-Diamond Assoc, v. American
Arbitration Ass'n. 211 N.W.2d 787 (Minn. 1973) (same); lensen v. Arrow Ins. Co.. 494
P.2d 1334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (public policy of Arizona favors arbitration); Dominion
Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Hart. 498 P.2d 1138 (Colo. 1972) (arbitration is favored).
5

An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration
any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the
parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable
except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the
revocation of a contract.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-107(l) (2002). Thus, if a party "show[s] an agreement to
arbitrate,55 the court "shall. . . order the parties to arbitrate.55 I d at § 78-31a-108(l).
It is well-established that "the goal of the Act is to encourage extra-judicial
settlement of legal disputes.55 Pacific Development. L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36,1112, 23
P.3d 1035. "The [Utah Arbitration] Act supports arbitration of both present and future
disputes and reflects long-standing public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods
of adjudicating disputes. . . ,55 Allred. 909 P.2d at 1265; accord McCoy v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Utah. 2001 UT 31,1114, 20 P.3d 901; Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359; Buzas
Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996); DeVore v. IHC
Hospitals. Inc.. 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994). In addition, this Court has long
affirmed "the strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an approved, practical and
inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion.55 Robinson & Wells v.
Warren. 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983).2
B.

The Utah Supreme Court and the Legislature Recognize Policy
Favoring the Use of Arbitration in the Physician-Patient Context.

In 1996, this Court made clear that arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable
in the physician-patient context, stating:
y

The Court has a well-established history in defining a general public policy that
liberally encourages the broad enforcement of extrajudicial dispute resolution agreements
that have been voluntarily entered into. See e ^ , Central Florida, 2002 UT 3, If 16; Buzas
Baseball, 925 P.2d at 946; Mred, 90 P.2d at 1265; Intermountain Power Agency v. Union
Pacific R.R. Co.. 961 P.2d 320, 325 (Utah 1988); Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady
Systems. Inc.. 731 P.2d 475, 479-480 (Utah 1986); Lindon, 636 P.2d at 1073.
6

We emphasize preliminarily that arbitration agreements are
favored in Utah and that no public policy requires such
agreements to be subject to a different analysis when they are
between physicians and patients. They are enforceable if they
meet the standards applicable to all contracts.
Sosa v. Paulos. 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996). In 1999, the Utah Legislature codified
this policy by amending the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to ensure the enforcability of
physician-patient arbitration agreements. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (1999). It also
clarified many of the issues associated with arbitration agreements entered into in the
physician-patient context. Among other things, § 78-14-17 specified agreement terms and
included the information that must be provided to the patient regarding arbitration, how
that information is to be provided to the patient, and an acknowledgment by the patient
that she received the information. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17. The level of detail
embodied in the statute reveals the Legislature's intent to ensure the validity and
enforcement of arbitration agreements entered into between physicians and their patients.
Section (7) of the statute similarly reveals the understanding of the Legislature that the
provisions in the statute are only valid to the extent that they apply to a contract that is not
subject to the Federal Arbitration Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(7).
1.

The Current Version of § 78-14-17 Specifically Provides that
Non-Signatories-Such as Spouses and Heirs-are Bound by
Arbitration Agreements Between Physicians and their Patients.

In 2004, the Legislature brought additional clarity to arbitration agreements in the
physician-patient context by amending § 78-14-17 to specifically prescribe that nonsignatories - such as spouses and heirs - are bound to agreements entered into by patients
(the "2004 Amendment55). The 2004 Amendment added, inter alia^ the following
emphasized language:

7

(b) the agreement shall require that:
(vii) the agreement only apply to:
(B) the claim of:
(I) a person who signed the agreement;
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under
Subsection (6); and
(III) the unborn child of the person described...; and
(C) the claim ofa person who is not a party to the contract if the sole
basis for the claim is an injury sustained by a person described in
Subsection (1) (b) (vii) (B);
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004) (emphasis added). This plain and unambiguous
language clearly illustrates the Legislature's intent to ensure the enforceability of arbitration
agreements that - as in the instant case - expressly bind non-signatories such as spouses and
heirs. Although the 2003 version of § 78-14-17 does not contain similar language, it also
does not include language expressly prohibiting enforcement of arbitration agreements
against non-signatories. See § 78-14-17 (2003). This is because the 2004 Amendment
merely codified previously existing common law principles and policy compelling the
enforcement of arbitration agreements against non-signatories.3
H.

UTAH LAW COMPELS ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT AGAINST THE SPOUSE AND HEIRS.
The plaintiff/appellee does not dispute that the Arbitration Agreement is a valid

enforceable agreement and that it would have been enforceable against Mr. Bybee had he
survived. The question before this Court is whether the terms of this Arbitration
Agreement can be enforced against Mr. Bybee's spouse although she was not a signatory to

^ UMA does not address the issue of whether the 2003 or 2004 version of § 78-14-17
applies to the instant agreement. UMA refers to the 2004 Amendment to illustrate that the
evolution of the policy favoring arbitration in Utah unequivocally includes binding spouses
and heirs to arbitration agreements entered into by patients.
8

the Agreement. The trial court ruled it cannot, finding that cc[i]n the instant case there is no
factual or legal basis to allow Mr. Bybee to unilaterally bind Mrs. Bybee to an Agreement to
Arbitrate.35 (R. at 171.) Not only does the court's ruling ignore public policy favoring
arbitration, it is expressly premised on a misinterpretation of Utah law.
A.

Fundamental Principles of Utah Contract Law Coupled with Policy
Favoring Arbitration Compel Enforcement of the Arbitration
Agreement Against Mr. Bybee's Spouse.

The Arbitration Agreement is, essentially, a contract. Pacific Development. L.C..
2001 UT 36 at 1111. It is axiomatic that "in interpreting a contract, the intentions of the
parties are controlling.53 Dixon v. Pro Image. Inc.. 1999 UT 89, U 13, 987 P.2d 48
(quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)). The Court should
"look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties5 intentions.55 lones v. ERA Brokers
ConsoL 2000 UT 61, f 12, 6 P.3d 1129 (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of
State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990)). "If the language within the four
corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties5 intentions are determined from the
plain meaning of the contractual language.55 Cent. Fla. Invests.. Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs.,
2002 UT 3,11 12, 40 P.3d 599. Further, this Court has "repeatedly held that competent
parties are free to bargain for any term that does not require a violation of the law.55 Salt
Lake County v. Western Dairymen Co-op.. Inc.. 2002 UT 39,1118, 48 P.3d 910; accord
Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson. 2000 UT 64, H 15, 8 P.3d 256.
In the present case, the plain language of the Arbitration Agreement provides:
Article 1: Agreement to Arbitrate: We hereby agree to submit to binding
arbitration all disputes and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and
losses arising from the medical care rendered or which should have been
rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims for monetary damages
against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association,
corporation or partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of
9

them (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Physician"), must be arbitrated
including, without limitation, claims for personal injury, loss of consortium,
wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages...
We expressly intend this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for
injuries.and losses arise out of medical care rendered or which should have been
rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, including any spouse or
heirs of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn at the time of
the occurrence giving rise to any claim (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Patient53).
(Arbitration Agreement Art. 1) (emphasis added) (copy attached as Addendum C). This
plain unambiguous language clearly demonstrates the parties expressly intended to submit
to arbitration any dispute of medical negligence arising out of the care provide by the
physician, whether it is asserted by the patient or his spouse or heirs. Indeed, this language
specifically reveals the parties5 intent to bind the patient's spouse to the terms of the
Agreement exactly as the Legislature endorses in the 2004 Amendment. Thus, fundamental
principles of Utah contract law require that the Arbitration Agreement be enforced against
Mrs. Bybee to give effect to the intent of Mr. Bybee and Dr. Abdulla as clearly revealed by
the plain language of the Agreement. See Dixon, 1999 UT 89 at H 13.
In addition, this Court has made clear that arbitration "is a remedy freely bargained
for by the parties.55 Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co.. 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah
1981). It is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, "in
keeping with [the] policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the
parties have agreed not to litigate.55 Cent. Fla. Inv., Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc, 2002 UT 3,11
16, 40 P.3d 599. As the Court explained in Lindon:
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted when the
issue contested is the scope of the clause. If the scope of an
arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the
clause should be construed in favor ofarbitration unless it can
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be said that it is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute.
Lindon, 636 P.2d at 1073 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the parties express intent to bind Mrs. Bybee to the Agreement,
coupled with this Court's well-settled policy requiring that the Agreement be interpreted in
favor of arbitration, mandates that the Arbitration Agreement be enforced against Mrs.
Bybee.
B.

Utah Wrongful Death Law Compels Enforcement of the Arbitration
Agreement Against Mr. Bybee's Spouse.

Although Utah courts recognize that ccan action for wrongful death is an
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased," Utah courts have "not entirely
separated the heirs' right from the decedent's because the heirs' right is in major part based
on the rights of support, both financial and emotional, that run to them from the deceased."
Tensen v. I H C Hospitals. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997). In Tensen this Court
stated:
We have held that the wrongful death cause ofaction is based on
the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed
subject to at least some of the defenses that would have been
available against the decedent had she lived to maintain her
own action.
I d at 332 (emphasis added).
In Utah, the wrongful death cause of action is subject to defenses that could have
been asserted against the deceased. Id, The following are examples of defenses that Utah
courts have recognized against a decedent's heirs: 1) heirs are bound by a comparative
negligence defense to the extent it would be enforceable against the deceased and any causes
of action the deceased could have brought, Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152,
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1155 (Utah 1998); 2) heirs are bound by the Utah Workers3 Compensation Act as to
claims against the deceased's employer, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105 (1997); and 3) heirs
are bound by a statute of limitations defense enforceable against the deceased and any causes
of action the deceased could have brought. Jensen, 944 P.2d at 332.
Had Mr. Bybee survived and sued for the alleged medical negligence at issue in this
case, the Arbitration Agreement would clearly be binding against him to terminate litigation
and compel arbitration. Where, as here, a patient expressly contracts to submit to
arbitration any dispute as to medical malpractice, it must be deemed to apply to all medical
negligence claims arising out of the care provided, whether they are asserted by the patient
or a third party. See Jensen, 944 P.2d 327 at 332.
In Jensen, this Court held that heirs could not maintain a wrongful death suit where
the "injured patient. . . chose to let the statute of limitations run on the underlying personal
injury claim35 prior to her death. In such a situation, the heirs5 wrongful death claims are
barred by the statute of limitations.35 IcL at 332-333.
The Tensen Court declined to separate the death from the causative wrong to permit
a wrongful death action, where the decedent's personal injury cause of action was barred at
the time of death, stating:
The injured individual is not merely a conduit for the support
of others, he is master of his own claim and he may settle the
case or win or lose a judgment on his own injury even though
others may be dependent upon him.
Tensen. 944 P.2d at 322 (emphasis added) (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 127, at 955 (5 th ed. 1984)). This Court recognized cc[t]he
majority of states refuse[] to allow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a wrongful death suit
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after the decedent has settled his or her personal injury case or won or lost a judgment
before dying." Tensen. 944 P.2d at 332-333.
Under Jensen, as "master of his own claim/5 a patient can completely cut off the
potential wrongful death claims of his heirs by not initiating a lawsuit prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations, either accidentally or intentionally. The heirs3
wrongful death claim is not so separate and independent as to allow them a separate statute
of limitations; rather, they are bound to the limitations period applicable to the patient and
to the patient's relating course of conduct prior to death.
If the Arbitration Agreement this case were not enforced against Mrs. Bybee, then
under Jensen, a patient could completely cut off his spouse from asserting a claim for
wrongful death by mere inaction, yet that same patient could not intentionally agree to the
forum for resolution by entering into an arbitration agreement. Such a result is not only
anomalous, but graces spouses and heirs with broader options for recourse relating to
medical care provided to the patient than the patient himself would have had.
in.

COURTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ROUTINELY ENFORCE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND THEIR
PATIENTS AGAINST NON-SIGNATORY SPOUSES AND HEIRS.
Cases with similar facts from other jurisdictions have enforced arbitration agreements

against spouses and heirs. In Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 2004 WL 324431 (U.S. 2004), for example, a surviving wife filed a wrongful death
claim alleging negligence by her husband's health care providers. The providers sought to
submit the claim to binding arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision between the
husband and his HMO. Applying contract construction principles, the Colorado Supreme
Court examined the arbitration agreement and determined that the language plainly applied
13

to "any claim of medical malpractice/5 which included the wife's claim for wrongful death,
even though she did not sign the arbitration agreement. IdL at 378-379.
The Allen court stated: "We hold that the arbitration agreement does apply to nonparty spouses because . . . a non-party may be bound by the terms of an agreement if the
parties so intend . . . ." IdL at 379 (emphasis added). It explained:
Although it is true that a wrongful death claim is separate and
distinct from a cause of action the deceased could have
maintained had he survived, this observation is not helpful in
determining whether separate wrongful death claims are in fact
included within the plain and ordinary meaning of the
agreement. Because the plain language of the agreement in this
case refers to "all claims" including those brought for "death,"
and because we must apply a strong presumption in favor of
arbitration, we find that the arbitration agreement applies to
wrongful death claims.
I d at 379-380 (emphasis added). 4
Similarly, in Mormile v. Sinclair. 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), the
court held that a physician/patient agreement containing an arbitration provision binding
the patient's spouse to arbitration was enforceable against the non-signatory spouse. In
reaching its decision, the Mormile court explained:
Mary's agreement with her physician provided for arbitration of all claims
arising out of or relating to Sinclair's medical treatment or services, including
the claims of any spouse or heir. There is no question the agreement was
intended to define and bind those individuals with a potential cause of action
if negligent treatment of Mary resulted in her injury or death, (citations
omitted). Gary's loss of consortium claim is based on Mary's injury or
disability allegedly resulting from Sinclair's professional negligence. An order
compelling arbitration of Gary's claim is consistent with the language of the
statute, subserves the legislative goals underlying section 1295, protects
Mary's right to privacy in her relationship with her physician and ensures that
y The Allen court went on to determine, however, that the arbitration agreement at
issue in that case was unenforceable because it failed to comply with the requirements of the
Colorado Health Care Availability Act. Allen. 71 P.3d at 384.
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no third party will be able to intrude into that relationship or veto Mary's
choices. In the balance, Mary's right to decide the terms of her medical
treatment outweighs Gary's right to a jury trial of his loss of consortium
claim.
Mormile, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 725 at 730.5
Likewise, in Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hospital. 327 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals held an arbitration agreement executed by a
deceased patient was binding upon the personal representative. The Ballard court stated:
Any substantive impediment that would have prevented the
decedentfrom commencing suit will likewise preclude suit by the
personal representative. For example, where the decedent's
death is the result of an injury arising out of the course of his
employment, the estate is bound, as the decedent would have
been, to the exclusive remedy provision of the worker's
compensation act, and the personal representative will be
prevented from maintaining a separate wrongful death action.
Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
Arbitration agreements are, moreover, routinely enforced against non-signing heirs
in other contexts. In Tansen v. Salomon Smith Barney. Inc., 776 A.2d 816 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 2001), for example, beneficiaries of retirement accounts brought a negligence
action against their father's financial advisors. The New Jersey Superior Court held that the

^ Indeed, in California, arbitration agreements containing similar provisions are
routinely enforced against non-signatories in medical malpractice cases. Madden v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, 131 Cal.Rptr. 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Hawkins v. Superior
Court. 152 Cal.Rptr. 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Herbert v. Superior Court. 215 Cal.Rptr.
477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Harris v. Superior Court. 233 Cal.Rptr. 186 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); Michaelis v. Schori, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Bolanos v.
Khalatian. 283 Cal.Rptr. 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Gross v. Recabaren. 253 Cal.Rptr. 820
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Garrison v. Superior Court. 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 350 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005).
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beneficiaries5 claim arose out of the father's agreement, and thus they were bound by the
arbitration clause. The Tansen court explained:
Arbitrability of a particular claim "depends not upon the
characterization of the claim, but upon the relationship of the
claim to the subject matter of the arbitration clause.55
Id. at 258 (quoting Wasserstein v. Kovatch. 618 A.2d 886, 286 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1993)).
Similarly, in Smith, Barney. Inc. v. Henry, 775 So.2d 722 (Miss. 2001), the
Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the heirs to financial accounts could be
compelled to arbitrate their claims relating to negligent management of the funds. The
court rejected the plaintiflPs argument that she was a non-signatory to the agreement and an
unintended third-party beneficiary and held that the express terms of the decedent's will
named the plaintiff a successor to the decedent's rights and thus subjected her to arbitration.
I d at 727.
Additionally, in Collins v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner and Smith. Inc.. 561 So.2d
952 (La. Ct. App. 1990), the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of
a motion to compel arbitration, and held non-signatory heirs and successors were bound by
a decedent's arbitration agreement with a brokerage firm, where the agreement expressly
bound successors and assigns. Id. at 955. The Collins court held the defendants were
entided to arbitration because "the Customer Agreement on its face applies to all accounts
of a customer, whether CMA5s or otherwise, and clearly requires arbitration of all disputes
arising out of the customer's business with Merrill Lynch.556 I d
® Similar results have been reached in other contexts. See, e ^ , American Bureau of
Shipping v. Tencara Shipyard. 170 F.3d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1999) (non-signatory insurance
underwriter compelled to arbitrate); Seborowski v. Pittsburgh Press Co.? 188 F.3d 163,
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These cases demonstrate the sound reasoning that a patient should be able to
determine by contract the forum where medical care provided to him will be addressed.
Decedents are able to bind their heirs through other contracts, wills and testamentary
dispositions, so the concept is neither new or illogical. It is, moreover, the policy adopted
by most federal and state law across the country.
IV.

FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN THIS
CASE WILL ADVERSELY IMPACT UTAH PHYSICIANS AND THEIR
PATIENTS.
Under the trial court's ruling, the only way to create an enforceable arbitration

agreement covering all claims arising out of medical care provided, including claims for
wrongful death, would be for spouses and all potential heirs to join in the execution of the
arbitration agreement. It is unrealistic to require the signatures of all the spouses and heirs
to bind them to an arbitration agreement, particularly since they may not even be identified
until the time of death.
Requiring heirs to participate in the creation of the arbitration agreement in order to
encompass claims of wrongful death would have the equally troublesome effect of requiring
that family members be given some minimum level of disclosure regarding the patient's
need for medical treatment. This may not only be at odds with the desires of the patient for
complete confidentiality, but it would also violate the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and preempt any judicial or statutory law to the contrary.
As such, this approach would authorize-indeed require-an intrusion into a patient's

168 (3d Cir. 1999) (non-signatory beneficiaries of deceased employees compelled to
arbitrate claims alleging breach of collective bargaining agreement signed by deceased
employees); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz. 659 F.2d 789, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1981)
(non-signatory transport company subject to arbitration as an agent of plaintiff).
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confidential relationship with his physician as the price for guaranteeing a third person
access to a jury trial on matters arising from the patient's own treatment.
Adoption of such a philosophy would violate the sanctity of the physician-patient
relationship - a safe haven which would be severely threatened if the physician were obliged
to obtain the signature of the patient's heirs to create an arbitration agreement. How is a
patient to maintain privacy in his or her physician consultations when, in essence, an heir's
intrusion into the relationship is a prerequisite to its formation? Such roadblocks to
establishing an arbitration agreement would be at odds with Utah legislation allowing indeed favoring - physician-patient arbitration agreements for claims arising from the
treatment provided. The purpose of the Utah Arbitration Act and § 78-14-17 of the Utah
Healthcare Malpractice Act is to facilitate, not eviscerate, the favored process of arbitration.
V.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS
REQUIRED BY THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP.
The physician-patient relationship is wholly voluntary, created by agreement, express

or implied. Garay v. County of Bexar. 810 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). The
physician-patient relationship is in this sense contractual, and the physician and the patient
may agree to make an arbitration agreement a term of their relationship. See Sosa v.
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996); Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004). The patient
may not be denied health care for refusing to sign an arbitration agreement. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-17(7) (2004). Further, the physician's legal duty of care is predicated on the
existence of this physician-patient relationship. See Dalley v. Utah Regional Med. Ctr.. 791
P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990); Farrow v. Health Servs. Corp.. 604 P.2d 474, 496 (Utah
1979). Accordingly, claims by a patient's wife for damages allegedly caused by medical
negligence, he,, wrongful death, are predicated on her husband's physician-patient
18

relationship. As the heirs5 claims are premised on the physician-patient relationship, they
must be subject to the agreed-upon terms of that relationship: the Arbitration Agreement.
In this case, the physician-patient relationship between the decedent and his
physician is the point of origin for any malpractice claim against the physician, by either his
wife, the estate, or any other heir. It was the decedent who entered into the physicianpatient relationship with Dr. Abdulla, and they undisputedly contracted to make the
Arbitration Agreement a term of their physician-patient relationship. Although Mrs. Bybee
and the other heirs are not signatories to the Agreement, they are bound by it as it defines
the scope and conditions of the physician-patient relationship that forms the basis for their
claims.
The necessity of this result is well-illustrated in the informed consent context. Under
Utah informed consent law, the physician has a duty to disclose to his patient "risks of
injury [that] might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment.55 Lounsbury v. CapeL
836 P.2d 188,193 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). A
physician5s duty of disclosure arises from the physician-patient relationship and is owed to
the patient, not to the patient's spouse or other family members. Id. at 198. The decision
whether or not to agree to treatment in light of the risks is vested in the patient. I d at 197.
If the patient agrees to treatment and consents to the risks attendant thereto, his wife is
bound by his consent. She could not file a loss of consortium or wrongful death claim on
the basis that she did not personally consent to the risks of treatment, or did not sign the
informed consent document. Thus, the concept of investing the competent patient with
complete and unbridled decision-making power relative to his/her care and all claims arising
therefrom, is fundamental to the physician-patient relationship under Utah law.
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VI.

FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT WILL
CREATE THE POTENTIAL FOR ANOMALOUS RESULTS WHEN
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM AND SURVIVAL CLAIMS ARE ALSO
ASSERTED.
A.

Loss of Consortium.

If, as the trial court here ruled, arbitration agreements are held to be unenforceable
against spouses and heirs for claims of wrongful death, then arbitration agreements would
also be held unenforceable against non-signing spouses for claims of loss of consortium.
This would conflict with the fact that a loss of consortium claim is by statute a derivative
claim subject to all of the same defenses as the underlying negligence claim. Utah Code
Ann. § 30-2-11 (1998).
Moreover, if non-signatories are not bound to arbitrate claims of loss of consortium
arising out of medical care rendered by the physician, they could proceed to litigate that
claim while the patient would be compelled to arbitrate claims for medical negligence
arising out of the same medical care. The physician would have to answer in both
arbitration and in a civil suit for claims dependent on the same operative facts regarding the
professional standard of care, its breach by the defendant and causation of injury to the
patient. This result is contrary to the purpose of the Arbitration Act, no savings would be
effected, and there would be the potential for conflicting results.
B.

Survival Claims.

The failure to enforce arbitration agreements against spouses heirs for claims of
wrongful death would also be inconsistent with Utah law governing survival claims. Utah
law is clear that wrongful death and survival claims are separate and distinct claims, allowing
recovery of separate and distinct damages. Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d
242, 2476 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). However, Utah law also provides that the personal
20

representative of a decedent's estate is bound by contracts signed by the decedent. See In re
Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982); see also Colorado Nad Bank of Denver v.
Friedman. 846 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). Thus, a survival claim is subject to an
arbitration agreement by the decedent.
Wrongful death claims often go hand-in-hand with survival claims, as the starting
point for both actions is an injury resulting in the decedent's death. If arbitration
agreements were held to be unenforceable against heirs for claims of wrongful death, then
the survival and wrongful death claims could be separated between the courts and
arbitration. The result would be unworkable, inefficient, and would create the potential for
conflicting results.
CONCLUSION
The reasons requiring the non-signing spouse heirs to be bound by an Arbitration
Agreement are far more convincing than any arguments to avoid enforcement of that
Agreement. It is not only consistent with the language of the Utah Arbitration statutes and
recent amendments to the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, it is essential to further the
goals of the legislative and judicially declared policy favoring arbitration, to safeguard the
physician-patient relationship, to preserve important privacy rights of the patient, and to
give effect to the intent of the parties to the Agreement.
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(3) Per diem reimbursement to panel members and expenses incurred by the panel in the conduct of prelitigatdon
panel hearings shall be paid by the division. Expenses related
to subpoenas are paid by the requesting party, including
witness fees and mileage.
(4) The proceedings are informal and formal rules of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery or perpetuation
of testimony in the proceedings, except upon special order of
the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.
(5) (a) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except upon
special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of
the parties. The proceedings are confidential and closed to
the public.
(b) No party has the right to cross-examine, rebut, or
demand that customary formalities of civil trials and
court proceedings be followed. The panel may, however,
request special or supplemental participation of some or
all parties in particular respects.
(c) Communications between the panel and the parties,
except the testimony of the parties on the merits of the
dispute, are disclosed to all other parties.
(6) The division shall appoint a panel to consider the claim
and set the matter for panel review as soon as practicable after
receipt of a request.
(7) Parties may be represented by counsel in proceedings
before a panel.
ISM
78*14-14. Decision and r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of panel —
No judicial or other review.
The panel shall render its opinion in writing not later than
30 days after the end of the proceedings. The panel shall
determine on the basis of the evidence whether each claim
against each health care provider has merit or has no merit
and, if meritorious, whether the conduct complained of resulted in harm to the claimant
There is no judicial or other review or appeal of the panel's
decision or recommendations.
ltes
78-14-15. Evidence of proceedings not admissible in
subsequent action — Panelist may not be
compelled to testify —- Immunity of panelist
from civil liability — Information regarding
professional conduct.
(1) Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical
review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evidence in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent
jurisdiction.
(2) No panelist may be compelled to testify in a civil action
subsequently filed with regard to the subject matter of the
panel's review. A panelist has immunity from civil liability
arising from participation as a panelist and for all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course
and scope of duties prescribed by this section.
(3) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to prohibit
the division from considering any information contained in a
statutory notice of intent to commence action, request for
prelitigation panel review, or written findings of a panel with
respect to the division's determining whether a licensee engaged in unprofessional or unlawful conduct.
ISM
78-14-16. Proceedings considered a binding arbitration hearing upon written agreement of parties — Compensation to members of panel.
Upon written agreement by all parties, the proceeding may
be considered a binding arbitration hearing and proceed under
Title 78, Chapter 31a, except for the selection of the panel,
which is done as set forth in Subsection 78-14-12(4). If the

78-14-17

proceeding is considered an arbitration proceeding, the parties
are equally responsible for compensation to the members of
the panel for services rendered.
ises
78-14-17. Arbitration agreements.
(1) After May 2,1999, for a binding arbitration agreement
between a patient and a health care provider to be validly
executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not
been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed:
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing and by verbal
explanation, the following information on:
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate
a claim instead of having the claim heard by a judge
or jury,
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in
which arbitrators are selected under the agreement;
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the agreement;
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into
the agreement and still receive health care if Subsection (2) applies;
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing
before the renewal date;
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about
the arbitration agreement answered; and
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within 30 days of signing the agreement; and
(b) the agreement shall require that:
(i) one arbitrator be collectively selected by all
persons claiming damages;
(ii) one arbitrator be selected by the health care
provider;
(iii) a third arbitrator be jointly selected by all
persons claiming damages and the health care provider from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah;
(iv) all parties waive the requirement of Section
78-14-12 to appear before a hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider;
(v) the patient be given the right to rescind the
agreement within 30 days of signing the agreement;
and
(vi) the term of the agreement be for one year and
that the agreement be automatically renewed each
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by
the patient or health care provider before the renewal
date.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be
denied health care of any kind from the emergency department of a general acute hospital, as defined in Section 26-21-2,
on the sole basis that the patient or a person described in
Subsection (5) refused to enter into a binding arbitration
agreement with a health care provider.
(3) A written acknowledgment of having received a written
and verbal explanation of a binding arbitration agreement
signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a
claim that the patient did not receive a written and verbal
explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1)
unless the patient:
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement
lacked the capacity to do so; or
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the
execution of the agreement was induced by the health
care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(4) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a
claim governed by a binding arbitration agreement that was
executed or renewed before May 3, 1999.
(5) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection
78-14-5(4), except a person temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agreement on behalf of a patient.
(6) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement
that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1
et seq.
MOS
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78-14-17. Arbitration agreements.
W After May 2, 1999, for a binding arbitration agreement
between a patient and a health care provider to be validly
executed or> if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not
been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed:
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following
information on:
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate
a claim instead of having the claim heard by a judge
or jury;
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in
which arbitrators are selected under the agreement;
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the agreement;
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into
the agreement and still receive health care if Subsection (3) applies;
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each
year unless the agreement is canceled in writing
before the renewal date;
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about
the arbitration agreement answered;
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within ten days of signing the agreement; and
(viii) the right of the patient to require mediation
, of the dispute prior to the arbitration of the dispute;
(b) the agreement shall require that:
(i) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(ii), a
panel of three arbitrators shall be selected as follows:
(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all
persons claiming damages;
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care
provider; and
(C) a third arbitrator:
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming
damages and the health care provider; or
(II) if both parties cannot agree on the
selection of the third arbitrator, the other
two arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator from a list of individuals approved as
arbitrators by the state or federal courts of
Utah; or
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be
selected;
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section
78^14-12 to appear before a hearing panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider;
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the
agreement within ten days of signing the agreement;
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and
th^t the agreement be automatically renewed each
yefcr unless the agreement is canceled in writing by
th$ patient or health care provider before the renewal
date;

(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal counsel;
(vii) the agreement only apply to:
(A) an error or omission that occurred after
the agreement was signed, provided that the
agreement may allow a person who would be a
proper party in court to participate in an arbitration proceeding;
(B) the claim of:
(I) a person who signed the agreement;
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under Subsection (6); and
(III) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for
12 months from the date the agreement is
signed; and
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party to
the contract if the sole basis for the claim is an
injury sustained by a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B); and
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to:
(i) read the written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration agreement; and
(ii) ask any questions.
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the
action shall:
(a) be subject to Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; and
(b) include any one or more of the following when
requested by the patient before an arbitration hearing is
commenced:
(i) mandatory mediation;
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for
both the liability and damages stages of an arbitration proceeding if the arbitration is bifurcated; and
(iii) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a
judgement against the provider in the appropriate
district court.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be
denied health care on the sole basis that the patient or a
person described in Subsection (6) refused to enter into a
binding arbitration agreement with a health care provider.
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written
explanation of a binding arbitration agreement signed by or on
behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a claim that the
patient did not receive a written explanation of the agreement
as required by Subsection (1) unless the patient:
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement
lacked the capacity to do so; or
i
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the
^execution of the agreement was induced by the health
tare provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a
claiiQ governed by a binding arbitration agreement that was
executed or renewed before May 3, 1999.
(6) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection
78-14-5(4), except a person temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agreement on behalf of a patient.
(7) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement
that is subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1
et seq.
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identifying information from the bureau, in the form
established by the bureau. A court of competent jurisdiction or a child placing agency licensed under Title 62A,
Chapter 4a, Part 6, may accept that request from the
adult adoptee or adult sibling, in the form provided by the
bureau, and transfer that request to the bureau. The
adult adoptee or adult sibling is responsible for notifying
the bureau of any change in information contained in the
request.
(b) The bureau may only release identifying information to an adult adoptee or adult sibling when it receives
requests from both the adoptee and his adult sibling.
(c) After matching the request of an adult adoptee with
that of his adult sibling, if the bureau has been provided
with sufficient information to make that match, the bureau shall notify both the adoptee and the adult sibling
that the requests have been matched, and disclose the
identifying information to those parties.
(3) Information registered with the bureau under this section is available only to a registered adult adoptee and his
registered birth parent or registered adult sibling, under the
terms of this section.
(4) Information regarding a birth parent who has not registered a request with the bureau may not be disclosed. (5) The bureau may charge a fee for services provided under
tJiis section, limited to the cost of providing those services.
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Arbitration process.
Representation.
Witnesses — Subpoenas — Depositions — V
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Judicial enforcement of preaward ruling
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78-31a-l to 78-31a-20. Repealed.
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1995

78-30-19. Restrictions on disclosure of information —
Violations — Penalty.
(1) Information maintained or filed with the bureau under
this chapter may not be disclosed except as provided by this
chapter, or pursuant to a court order.
(2) Any person who discloses information obtained from the
bureau's voluntary adoption registry in violation of this chapter, or knowingly allows that information to be disclosed in
violation of this chapter is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1987

CHAPTER 31
ARBITRATION [REPEALED]
78-31-1 to 78-31-22. Repealed.

1986

CHAPTER 31a
UTAH UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
Section
78-31a-l to 78-31a-20. Repealed.
78-31a-101.
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78-31a-102.
Definitions.
78-31a-103.
Notice.
78-31a-104.
Application.
78-3 la-105.
Effect of agreement to arbitrate — Nonwaivable provisions.
78-31a-106.
Application for judicial relief.
78-31a-107. Validity of agreement to arbitrate,
78-31a-108.
Motion to compel arbitration.
78-31a-109.
Provisional remedies.
78-31a-110.
Initiation of arbitration.
78-3la-111.
Consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings.
78-3la-112.
Appointment of arbitrator — Service as a neutral arbitrator.
78-31a-113.
Disclosure by arbitrator.
78-31a-114.
Action by majority.
78-31a-115.
Immunity of arbitrator — Competency to testify — Attorney's fees and costs.

78-31a-101. Title.
This chapter is known as Out "\ftah \5inionn Arhitratto
Act."
2(M
78-31a-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Arbitration organization* means an a s s o c i a t e
agency, board, commission, or other entity that is neutr*
and initiates, sponsors, or administers an arbitratio
proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an afb
trator.
(2) "Arbitrator" means an individual appointed to rer
der an award, alone or with others, in a controversy ths
is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
(3) "Court" means a court of competent jurisdiction i
this state.
/
(4) "Knowledge* means actual knowledge.
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, bus]
ness trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liabilit
company, association, joint venture, government, govern
mental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, pufcli
corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(6) "Record" means information that is inscribed on «
tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or othe
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
200
78-31a-lQ3. Notice.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a persoi
gives notice to another person by taking action that is reason
ably necessary to inform the other person in ordinary course
whether or not the other person acquires knowledge of th<
notice.
(2) A person has notice if the person has knowledge of tin
notice or has received notice.
(3) A person receives notice when it comes to the person's
attention or the notice is delivered at the person's place o
residence or place of business, or at another location held oul
by the person as a place of delivery of such communications.
2«M

78-31a-104. Application.
(1) This chapter applies to any agreement to arbitrate made
on or after May 6, 2002.
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